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Abstract 
Self-separation is a concept of flight operations 
that aims to provide user benefits and increase 
airspace capacity by transferring traffic separation 
responsibility from ground-based controllers to the 
flight crew. Self-separation is enabled by cooperative 
airborne surveillance, such as that provided by the 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-
B) system and airborne separation assistance 
technologies.  This paper describes an assessment of 
the impact of ADS-B system performance on the 
performance of self-separation as a step towards 
establishing far-term ADS-B performance 
requirements. Specifically, the impacts of ADS-B 
surveillance range and interference limitations were 
analyzed under different traffic density levels. The 
analysis was performed using a batch simulation of 
aircraft performing self-separation assisted by 
NASA’s Autonomous Operations Planner prototype 
flight-deck tool, in two-dimensional airspace. An 
aircraft detected conflicts within a look-ahead time of 
ten minutes and resolved them using strategic closed 
trajectories or tactical open maneuvers if the time to 
loss of separation was below a threshold.  
While a complex interaction was observed 
between the impacts of surveillance range and 
interference, as both factors are physically coupled, 
self-separation performance followed expected 
trends. An increase in surveillance range resulted in a 
decrease in the number of conflict detections, an 
increase in the average conflict detection lead time, 
and an increase in the percentage of conflict 
resolutions that were strategic. The majority of the 
benefit was observed when surveillance range was 
increased to a value corresponding to the conflict 
detection look-ahead time. The benefits were 
attenuated at higher interference levels. Increase in 
traffic density resulted in a significant increase in the 
number of conflict detections, as expected, but had 
no effect on the conflict detection lead time and the 
percentage of conflict resolutions that were strategic. 
With surveillance range corresponding to ADS-B 
minimum operational performance standards for 
Class A3 equipment and without background 
interference, a significant portion of conflict 
resolutions, 97 percent, were achieved in the 
preferred strategic mode.  The majority of conflict 
resolutions, 71 percent, were strategic even with very 
high interference (over three times that expected in 
2035). 
Introduction 
In order to handle the expected increase in air 
traffic, the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System (NextGen) will introduce key capabilities in 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) [1]. Major among 
them is the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) system, which provides 
cooperative airborne surveillance enabling aircraft to 
exchange state and intent information with each 
other. ADS-B, along with other capabilities such as 
precise navigation and digital communication, enable 
shifting the ATM system towards a distributed 
architecture where some ATM responsibilities may 
be partially shouldered by aircraft systems and flight 
crews, thus increasing airspace capacity [2,3]. Near-
term distributed concepts include delegated 
separation, whereby the service provider authorizes 
specific aircraft to temporarily maintain separation 
between themselves for limited operations such as 
interval management. Far-term concepts include self-
separation, whereby traffic separation responsibility 
is transferred to the flight crew for extended periods 
of time. The flight crew is assisted by Airborne 
Separation Assistance System (ASAS) technologies 
to maintain separation.  
ADS-B performance requirements are 
determined by the required performance of 
applications such as delegated separation and self-
separation. The current ADS-B requirements are 
defined in the minimum operational performance 
standards (MOPS) document [4], which considered 
near-term ADS-B applications. However, the limiting 
case for ADS-B performance may be far-term 
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applications such as self-separation, which must meet 
performance levels that are required to achieve the 
ATM safety and resource management goals. It must 
be determined whether the performance of self-
separation operations is stable and predictable under 
a variety of conditions including variations in 
surveillance system performance. As a step towards 
establishing far-term ADS-B performance 
requirements, a thorough understanding of the 
impacts of surveillance system performance on self-
separation is needed. In particular, various aspects of 
the system for exchanging surveillance data may 
impact the self-separation performance. These 
aspects include: the range over which surveillance 
data is exchanged, the interference/noise 
environment, the surveillance message content and 
update rate, and the use of complementary systems 
such as the ground-based Traffic Information 
System-Broadcast (TIS-B) which broadcasts 
surveillance information about aircraft not equipped 
for ADS-B. Additionally, the handling of incomplete 
surveillance data by the ASAS and external factors 
such as weather and traffic density may also impact 
self-separation performance.  
This study investigated the impact of three 
factors on self-separation performance: the range 
over which surveillance data is exchanged, referred 
to as the surveillance range; the interference 
environment, and traffic density.  This study was 
conducted as a batch simulation using the Airspace 
and Traffic Operations Simulation (ATOS) hosted in 
the Air Traffic Operations Laboratory (ATOL) at the 
NASA Langley Research Center.  The system for 
exchanging surveillance data was modeled to 
represent the 1090 MHz Mode S ADS-B protocol [5]. 
The ASAS used in this simulation environment was 
the Autonomous Operations Planner (AOP), a 
sophisticated NASA-developed research model of an 
airborne automation system built for the study of 
advanced distributed air-ground operational concepts 
[6]. Previous batch studies using AOP have focused 
on analyzing the impacts of increasing traffic density, 
pilot response time, and wind uncertainty on the 
safety performance of self-separation under perfect 
surveillance system performance [7,8,9]. This study 
aims to complement these studies by gaining an 
understanding of the impact of key aspects of 
surveillance system performance on self-separation 
performance using the AOP model. 
This paper begins by providing background on 
the surveillance system limitations being studied. 
Next, the simulation environment is described, 
including modeling of the AOP and the ADS-B 
systems. These are followed by the experiment 
approach including the experiment factors, scenario, 
and metrics used for evaluation. The results of the 
simulations are then presented, quantifying the 
impacts of surveillance range and interference on 
self-separation performance under the conditions of 
the experiment. Finally, conclusions and 
recommendations for future research are presented. 
Surveillance System Limitations 
This study investigated the impact on self-
separation performance of two main aspects of the 
system for exchanging surveillance data: surveillance 
range and interference environment.  
The surveillance range refers to the distance 
over which the transmitted surveillance message may 
travel and remain strong enough to be received and 
interpreted. The range impacts the lead time for 
conflict detection. A short range may result in the 
self-separation algorithm of a receiving aircraft 
obtaining state and intent information about a 
transmitting aircraft on an intercept trajectory with a 
short lead time. A short lead time reduces the time 
available to perform successful or effective conflict 
resolution as well as the flexibility available for 
conflict resolution in terms of the number of 
available solutions. Consequently, conflict resolution 
may fail, increasing the possibility of loss of 
separation. Or it may succeed, but in the form of a 
less preferred tactical solution. The range of a system 
for exchanging surveillance data is dependent on the 
system hardware, most significantly the transceiver 
characteristics (such as transmit power and receiver 
sensitivity), as well as the transmission medium, e.g., 
atmospheric attenuation increases with inclement 
weather.  
If the broadcast frequency (1090 MHz for ADS-
B) is heavily populated with transmissions, 
interference can occur and degrade the surveillance 
performance of the system by reducing its ability to 
correctly decode messages and thus, alter the 
reception probability of messages. The level of 
interference relates to the number of messages 
arriving at the receiving aircraft at the same time, 
which depends on several factors including the 
number of transmitting entities surrounding the 
aircraft and the message transmission rate. The 
transmitting entities include surrounding aircraft, 
transmitting ADS-B and Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS) messages, and other 
entities such as ground-based Secondary Surveillance 
Radar systems which also operate on the 1090 MHz 
frequency. In addition, the number of transmitting 
entities contributing to interference is a function of 
surveillance system range, since more aircraft are 
discovered with increased range.  
Simulation Environment 
This study was conducted as a batch simulation 
using the ATOS simulation environment hosted in 
ATOL at the NASA Langley Research Center.  Each 
individual aircraft in ATOS includes its associated 
flight management computer, ASAS prototype, and 
pilot model, and is hosted on a separate computer.  
The resulting system is a fully-scalable, agent-based 
simulation of self-separation, with each individual 
aircraft acting independently based on data made 
available over simulated communication links. The 
following subsections describe the models for the 
ASAS, the communication links, and the surveillance 
information shared between aircraft. 
ASAS Modeling 
The ASAS used in this simulation was the AOP, 
a sophisticated NASA-developed research model of 
an airborne automation system built for the study of 
advanced distributed air-ground operational concepts. 
AOP provides an integrated suite of capabilities for 
managing trajectory changes from the flight deck 
perspective, including conflict detection, resolution, 
prevention, and trajectory constraint conformance 
[6]. The conflict detection (CD) function of AOP 
uses state and trajectory intent data received from 
other traffic aircraft over communication links using 
the ADS-B protocol in combination with ownship 
state data, autoflight mode settings, and flight plan 
information to deterministically predict future losses 
of separation. In the case of dropped ADS-B 
messages, AOP uses the previous intent data until a 
complete set of new data is received. The lateral 
minimum separation requirement was conservatively 
set to 5.2 nautical miles and the CD time horizon was 
set to ten minutes. Uncertainty buffers were applied 
to individual flight segments to account for trajectory 
prediction errors. When resolving conflicts, AOP 
attempts to find resolutions that are free of conflict 
for the next 20 minutes. For conflict resolution (CR), 
AOP contains both strategic and tactical capabilities.  
Tactical CR refers to open-loop vectors or altitude 
changes to resolve conflicts with no predetermined 
plan to reconnect to the original flight plan. Strategic 
CR refers to the single action of modifying the flight 
plan such that the conflict is resolved and the aircraft 
reconnects to the original flight plan. Strategic and 
tactical CR can use both lateral and vertical degrees 
of freedom. In this two-dimensional (2D) study, they 
were both restricted to lateral resolutions only.  
AOP’s strategic CR takes into account all 
known trajectory constraints, including trajectories of 
nearby traffic, airspace hazards, ownship 
performance limits, and required time of arrival 
(RTA) constraints. A genetic algorithm is employed 
to search within a set of pre-defined geometric 
patterns to generate CR trajectories that 
simultaneously accommodate these constraints [10]. 
Predefined patterns for strategic CR include path 
stretches with one turn out and one turn back 
maneuver; offsets with a turn out maneuver, a 
segment parallel to the original trajectory and a turn 
back maneuver; and direct-intercepts, with a short-
cutting segment that intercepts a downstream 
segment. Additionally, the strategic CR algorithm 
can be set to use different optimization schemes 
including minimizing fuel burn and minimizing path 
deviation. For this study, the optimization scheme 
was set to minimize fuel burn. 
AOP computes either a strategic or tactical CR 
based on the predicted time until the first loss of 
separation (LOS) and on priority rules that dictate 
which aircraft should give way. The priority of an 
aircraft is based roughly on Visual Flight Rules, e.g., 
the aircraft approaching from the right has priority. 
The burdened aircraft attempts a strategic solution 
unless the time remaining to LOS is five minutes or 
less, when it switches to tactical CR. The priority 
aircraft starts attempting a strategic solution if the 
conflict is within seven minutes and not yet resolved 
by the burdened aircraft. It then attempts a tactical 
solution if the conflict is not resolved by the 
burdened aircraft and the conflict is within four 
minutes. Once a suitable CR trajectory is calculated, 
and it is verified conflict free for 20 minutes based on 
available traffic data, it is presented to the pilot 
model for review and execution. Immediately upon 
execution, the aircraft’s ADS-B module broadcasts 
the new ownship trajectory intent data. 
Surveillance Information Shared Between 
Aircraft 
A number of surveillance messages are shared 
between aircraft for the purposes of self-separation, 
as shown in Table 1. These include broadcasting of 
both state and trajectory-intent information for use by 
AOP in trajectory prediction.  
Table 1 . ADS-B Report Characteristics 
Report 
Type 
Update 
Rate 
Content 
Mode 
Status  
2 – 5 
sec 
Aircraft ID, aircraft 
capabilities, operations 
mode, state vector quality 
State 
Vector  
1 sec Current state information 
Target 
State 
1 – 2 
sec 
Limited intent for tactical 
separation 
Trajectory 
Change 
1 – 3 
sec 
Trajectory intent for 
trajectory-based 
separation 
 
For this study, aircraft intent was shared with 
other entities through Target State reports, which 
represent short-term tactical intent, and Trajectory 
Change (TC) reports, which represent long-term 
strategic trajectory-based intent. TC reports provide 
descriptive information of upcoming trajectory 
change points (TCPs) that collectively describe the 
next several segments of the planned trajectory.  In 
this study, TC reports consist of a set of TCPs that 
were broadcast sequentially at a rate of one Hz. This 
approach was taken due to bandwidth limitations in 
the 1090 MHz frequency such that the ADS-B 1090 
MHz Mode S Extended Squitter message used for 
exchanging surveillance information can only support 
a single TCP. In this study, the number of TCPs was 
effectively unlimited by sending as many as needed 
(up to 12) to cover 20 minutes of intent. Thus, if four 
TCPs are necessary to define the next 20 minutes of 
the trajectory, then it would take four seconds to 
transmit the complete set of TCPs.  Currently, the 
self-separation algorithm of AOP waits to receive a 
complete set of new TCPs before updating an 
aircraft’s trajectory in its calculations. Message 
dropping due to surveillance system limitations (as 
discussed in the next section) might delay the 
reception of the complete set. For example, say a set 
of five TCPs is broadcast by the sending aircraft, and 
TCP number three in the sequence is not received due 
to interference. The receiving system then waits until 
a rebroadcast of the dropped TCP is received in a 
future round of TC reports before using the full set of 
five TCPs. Since TCPs are broadcast at 1 Hz, it will 
take, at least, an additional three seconds beyond the 
first five-TCP broadcast to receive the missing TCP. 
Therefore, the receipt of the trajectory change by 
AOP will be delayed three seconds, which in turn 
delays the updating of an aircraft’s trajectory by AOP 
and performing of CD. This can delay the detection 
and, consequently, resolution of a conflict, 
particularly if the dropping of TCPs occurs 
repeatedly. One purpose of this study was to assess 
the severity of these effects. 
ADS-B System Modeling 
The ADS-B model simulates real world 
characteristics of exchanging surveillance data by 
applying a message reception probability at “each 
receiving aircraft … by filtering and modifying the 
received data stream” [5]. A successfully received 
message arrives at the receiving aircraft with 
adequate signal strength, which is related to the range 
of the surveillance system, and is successfully 
differentiated from interfering messages and 
decoded. As mentioned in the previous section, 
several different types of messages were shared 
between aircraft in this study. State vectors or target 
states can be shared using a single message while TC 
reports composed of several TCPs are shared using a 
series of messages with a single message containing a 
single TCP.  
For the ADS-B model, “successful reception 
probability was developed based on the number of 
ground interrogators, transmitter/receiver power 
budget, range effects and signal overlap effects” [5]. 
The probability equation adds the probability of 
successful message reception with no interference 
with probabilities for successful reception in the 
presence of interference from various types of 
messages (e.g., Mode S and Mode A/C). The 
probability of successful message reception with no 
interference is the probability of no interference 
combined with adequate signal strength of the 
received message which depends on range. The 
probability terms for successful reception in the 
presence of interference are dependent on both 
surveillance range and the interference environment. 
A detailed model is described in [5].  
The range of the system for communicating 
surveillance data is modeled by the system’s 
hardware properties and the transmission medium 
characteristics which affect the signal strength at the 
receiving aircraft, as shown in the following equation 
S = PT × GT × LT × GR × LR × Lr, which was 
expressed in [5] logarithmically as: 
S = PT + GT + LT + GR + LR + Lr                  (1) 
where S is the received power of the signal. PT, GT, 
LT, GR and LR are hardware characteristics, 
respectively the transmitter power, the transmitter 
antenna gain, the transmitter cable loss, the receiver 
antenna gain and the receiver cable loss. Lr is a 
transmission medium characteristic: the range-
dependent free-space path loss which relates range to 
the received signal power and ultimately, to the 
probability of successful message reception. Lr is 
affected, among other things, by atmospheric 
attenuation and weather [5].  For this study, weather 
effects on the surveillance system performance were 
not modeled. Instead, the effect of range was studied 
by modifying the hardware characteristics within the 
ADS-B model. Since Equation (1) is logarithmic, the 
signal power and therefore, the probability of 
successful message reception is related to range 
between the sending and receiving aircraft with an 
exponential decay function as shown in Fig. 1. The 
surveillance range is defined as the maximum 
distance over which a message can be sent and 
received successfully. With increase in the 
surveillance range of an aircraft, the decay function 
relating range to successful reception probability 
changes such that an aircraft not only receives 
messages from traffic aircraft further away but the 
probability of receiving messages from closer aircraft 
also increases. 
If an aircraft is within range, a message sent 
from it arrives at the receiving aircraft with adequate 
signal strength; however, it may still be dropped due 
to the presence of interference which degrades the 
surveillance system’s ability to differentiate the 
correct message. The interference level relates to the 
number of messages arriving at the receiving aircraft 
at the same time, which depends on several factors 
including the number of transmitting entities 
surrounding the aircraft and the message transmission 
rate. For this study, the aircraft that are considered as 
contributing to interference for a particular message 
are those within a circle of radius: square-root of two 
times the distance between the sending and receiving 
aircraft. This “noise” radius encompasses traffic 
aircraft messages whose signal strength is within 
three dB of the message under consideration and 
thus, significant enough to cause interference. If there 
is an increase in the range of a surveillance system, it 
is able to see messages arriving from aircraft further 
away. However, these messages then also experience 
greater interference as the “noise” radius increases.  
 
Given the interdependence of surveillance range 
and interference as described above, it is difficult to 
study their impact independently. For this study, the 
impact of interference was isolated by introducing 
traffic into the simulation that did not physically 
interact with the other aircraft. Thus, these aircraft 
acted only as message transmitting entities in order to 
vary the number of messages causing interference 
(representing, for example, ground radar systems) 
without causing conflicts. This traffic is referred to as 
“interference-only traffic” throughout this paper, and 
interference caused by messages transmitted by these 
aircraft is referred to as “background interference”. 
Traffic aircraft that were simulated as actually flying 
and physically interacting with other aircraft are 
referred to as “simulated traffic aircraft” throughout 
this paper.  
Figure 1. Relationship of Range to Probability of 
Successful Message Reception (figure taken from 
reference [5]) 
Surveillance 
Range 
Separately, a model option was used to simulate 
an ideal case of unlimited surveillance range and no 
interference. This option models ADS-B message 
reception using a step function: messages arriving 
from aircraft within the specified range have a 
message reception probability of one, and those 
arriving from aircraft outside the specified range have 
a zero reception probability. No interference effects 
are included in this model. To model an unlimited 
surveillance range, a value much larger than the 
maximum distance between aircraft in the simulation 
was used. 
Experiment Approach 
The experiment was conducted as a batch 
simulation study using a pilot model in place of 
human pilots. The subsections below describe the 
experiment scenario, factor levels and metrics.  
Experiment Scenario 
The experiment scenario, shown in Fig. 2, 
consisted of two concentric circles of 80 and 160 nm 
radii. The region between the circles served as an 
initialization region and the region within the inner 
circle as the test region. Aircraft were created at the 
outer boundary of the initialization region and their 
paths traversed the test region where experiment 
metrics were collected. AOP only resolved conflicts 
that were predicted to occur, at least partially, inside 
the test region. Ignoring conflicts in the initialization 
region served to exclude conflicts that were detected 
at initialization with an unrealistically short lead 
time, i.e., within the CD look–ahead horizon of ten 
minutes, thus not providing AOP adequate time to 
resolve them with preferred resolution approaches. 
Therefore, the relative dimensions of the two circles 
were chosen to allow approximately ten minutes 
flying time between them and twenty minutes of 
flying time in the test region, assuming an average 
aircraft speed of eight nm per minute. The intended 
result was to simulate aircraft already en-route with 
no conflicts at initialization entering an airspace 
region (the 160 nm diameter “test region”) populated 
with other aircraft. Using AOP, the aircraft adjusted 
their trajectories as necessary to ensure they did not 
come closer than the lateral separation requirement of 
five nm. As a conservative measure, the conflict 
detection and resolution criteria in AOP were set to 
5.2 nm. 
The initial route of an aircraft was defined by 
three fixes. The first fix was randomly placed on the 
perimeter of the outer circle. The second fix was 
located randomly on the opposite side of the test 
region on the inner circle to ensure that the nominal 
route connecting the first and second fixes intersected 
the test region.  Because AOP normally computes 
trajectories that may descend toward the destination, 
a third fix was created sufficiently far along the 
nominal route to avoid descent predictions within the 
test region, thus creating a 2D scenario with all 
aircraft in cruise. A 2D scenario design simplifies the 
modeling and analysis but is also considered a more 
challenging traffic management problem in that only 
lateral resolutions are available to solve conflicts. 
 
A random airspeed between Mach 0.77 and 0.83 
was assigned to the aircraft. All trajectories were 
placed at the same altitude, and only lateral 
resolutions were exercised. In order to maintain the 
desired traffic densities, each aircraft was terminated 
as soon as it exited the test region and another aircraft 
reinserted on a new route. Note that some aircraft 
may not have traversed the test region and were 
terminated upon exiting the initialization region. This 
happens when a conflict detected in the test region is 
resolved while the aircraft is still in the initialization 
region and the modified lateral path keeps the aircraft 
outside the test region. All aircraft were equipped for 
self-separation, and there were no wind, weather 
hazards or airspace restrictions. 
Experiment Factors 
This study investigated the impact of three 
factors on self-separation performance: two aspects 
related to exchanging surveillance data - surveillance 
range and background interference - and the external 
parameter of traffic density. 
The surveillance range was varied by setting the 
transmitter power and keeping the other hardware 
Figure 2. Experiment Scenario 
parameters in Equation (1) constant at the Class A3 
MOPS requirements for 1090 MHz ADS-B [5]. 
Changing the transmitter power changed the message 
signal power level at the receiving aircraft. The full 
list of received signal power levels studied is shown 
in Table 2 along with the corresponding estimated 
surveillance range values. Since the ADS-B model 
directly uses transmitter power in calculating 
message reception probability, the value of 
surveillance range achieved in the simulation might 
be slightly different due to numerical approximation. 
Setting the transmitter power to the Class A3 MOPS 
requirements for 1090 MHz ADS-B corresponds to a 
range of approximately 97 nm [5].  
Table 2. Relationship of Surveillance Range to 
Received Power Level 
Surveillance 
Range (nm) 
Received 
Power Level 
(dB) 
Received Power 
Level Compared 
to Baseline 
71 48.3 0.54X 
86 50 0.79X 
97 51 Baseline: 1X 
160 55.4 2.75X 
200 57.3 4.27X 
243 59 6.31X 
324 61.5 11.22X 
 
Table 3 shows the combinations of surveillance 
range and background interference levels used in the 
experiment. In addition to a no background 
interference level, two other levels, high and very 
high, were used. The background interference levels 
were chosen to be theoretically high in order to stress 
the self-separation capability. Pre-experiment 
investigation showed that high levels of background 
interference were needed to invoke self-separation 
performance that is sufficiently different from the no-
interference case to be able to characterize the 
impacts of interference. This is partially due to the 
conservative settings of AOP parameters such as the 
CD look-ahead horizon (ten minutes) and the tactical 
CR override horizon (five minutes for priority aircraft 
and four minutes for burdened aircraft). The 
background interference level was varied by 
changing the number of “interference-only” aircraft 
(i.e., broadcasting information but not flying). As 
discussed in the previous section, this 2D study 
simulated aircraft self-separation at only a single 
flight level. However, aircraft at a particular flight 
level can experience interference from aircraft at 
other flight levels. The high and very high 
background interference levels in this study were 
caused, respectively, by approximately 965 and 1687 
interference-only aircraft in the 320 nm diameter 
airspace of the scenario. These traffic levels 
correspond approximately to 2.0 to 3.6 times the 
number of traffic aircraft contributing to interference 
for the year 2035 as predicted by the FAA’s report on 
1090 MHz Spectrum Congestion [11] using a yearly 
traffic growth rate of 1.7% (2009 estimate) from 
2007 and representing aircraft at all flight levels in a 
high density Northeast corridor. The report also 
presented interference predictions using a higher 
traffic growth rate of 4.1% from 2007, based on an 
earlier (2008) traffic prediction. Compared to the 
these higher interference predictions, the background 
interference traffic levels used in this study 
correspond approximately to one to two times the 
number of traffic aircraft contributing to interference 
in the year 2035.  The interference-only aircraft may 
also represent interference sources such as radar 
interrogations and TIS-B that use the 1090 MHz 
channel. 
Table 3. Experiment Matrix for All Traffic 
Density Levels 
Background 
Interference 
Level 
Surveillance Range (nm) 
 71 86 97 160 200 243 324
None X X X X  X X 
High X  X X X X X 
Very High X  X X X X X 
Special case: unlimited surveillance range and no 
interference  
 
As an ideal baseline, a case with unlimited 
surveillance range and no interference was also run 
as described in ADS-B System Modeling section. As 
Table 3 shows, more low surveillance range values 
were simulated for the no background interference 
case whereas, for the high and very high interference 
cases, more high surveillance range values were 
simulated. This decision was based on pre-
experiment observations that peak self-separation 
performance is reached at lower surveillance ranges 
under the lower interference level, and hence, more 
data points may be needed at lower surveillance 
ranges in this case. 
Finally, three different traffic levels were 
studied: 30, 40 and 60 aircraft in the 320 nm diameter 
airspace of the experiment scenario resulting in 
traffic densities of 3.73, 4.97 and 7.46 aircraft/10000 
nm2. Based on the historical traffic analysis in [7], 
these densities correspond respectively to 2.07X, 
2.76X and 4.14X of the mean traffic density (1.8 
aircraft/10000 nm2) in 2004 of a median-density en 
route traffic sector (ZOA31 of the Oakland center). 
Higher traffic densities cause more interference due 
to increase in the number of surveillance messages 
and result in a more constrained solution space for 
CR. The experiment matrix in Table 3 was repeated 
for each traffic density level. 
Experiment Metrics 
Surveillance system and self-separation 
performance metrics were used to characterize the 
impact of the experiment factors. Surveillance system 
metrics included: 
 Percentage of messages received: defined 
as the ratio of the total number of 
messages received to the total number of 
messages transmitted for all flights in the 
simulation 
 Percentage of in-range messages received: 
defined as the ratio of the total number of 
messages received to the total number of 
messages transmitted from flights that are 
within range of a receiving aircraft 
Self-separation performance metrics included: 
 Number of conflict detections 
 Average conflict detection lead time: 
defined as the mean predicted time to the 
first loss of separation, sampled at first 
detection, for all conflict detections 
 Percent strategic conflict resolution: 
defined as the ratio of the number of 
strategic conflict resolutions to the total 
number of strategic and tactical conflict 
resolutions for all aircraft 
 Number of losses of separation relative to 
the number of conflicts detected 
 
The total number of conflict detections was used 
as a basis for several metrics as defined above. In 
self-separation operations, a conflict may be detected 
by one or both aircraft involved in the conflict and 
may also be resolved by one or both aircraft. The 
total number of conflict detections may include cases 
where both aircraft detect the same conflict, in which 
case the conflict is counted twice in the total number 
of conflict detections. Additionally, the total conflict 
count is calculated through post-analysis of AOP 
output data. AOP performs conflict detection every 
ten seconds and records information about any 
conflicts detected. The same conflict reappears in 
each of these records until it is resolved or ceases to 
be predicted. The post-analysis then associates a 
time-contiguous set of records for a conflict between 
the same two aircraft with a single conflict. 
Therefore, a borderline conflict (one that is at the 
boundary of separation loss) is counted as multiple 
conflicts if it “flickers” or disappears and reappears 
several times. These factors may result in the number 
of conflict detections overestimating the number of 
conflicts. On the other hand, a so-called  
“sidewalk” situation may result in under-counting 
conflicts. A sidewalk situation occurs when two 
aircraft in conflict both maneuver to resolve the 
conflict in a way that causes another conflict between 
them, such as sometimes happens when two people 
simultaneously yield to each other as they approach 
on a sidewalk. If there is no time interruption in the 
AOP conflict records, the resulting conflict is 
counted as part of the original conflict that caused the 
sidewalk situation. The over- and under- counting 
contributed to variability in the conflict detection 
metric, as discussed in the Results section. 
Nevertheless, the number of conflict detections 
corresponds to the number of actionable events for 
the aircraft involved and, thus, is considered an 
appropriate performance metric for self-separation. 
Results 
This section presents the simulation results for 
the combinations of the experiment factors presented 
in Table 3 demonstrating their impact on the metrics 
presented in the previous section. In some cases, 
trend lines were added to the data using Matlab to fit 
a power equation of the form (a × xn + b). 
Percentage of Messages Received 
The impacts of surveillance range and 
interference on the percentage of messages received 
are presented first, as they explain most of the 
impacts on self-separation performance presented in 
the following sections. The percentage of messages 
received was measured over all messages transmitted 
from all aircraft in the simulation, both within and 
outside the surveillance range of a receiving aircraft to 
determine the combined effects of range and 
interference.  In Fig. 3, the percentage of messages 
received is plotted as a function of surveillance range 
for each background interference level. The data for 
the 30-, 40-, and 60-aircraft traffic density cases were 
essentially coincident; the figure shows data for the 
30-aircraft case. (The impact of traffic density on 
self-separation performance is discussed in the 
following sections).  
 
Under unlimited surveillance range and no 
background interference, all of the messages 
transmitted were received as expected (shown in the 
figure as a horizontal dashed line because the range 
value used for this case is off the chart). With no 
background interference (the blue curve), the effect 
of surveillance range was the most significant. At low 
surveillance range, few messages were received 
because most of the messages were transmitted from 
aircraft outside the range of a receiving aircraft. As 
the surveillance range was increased, the percentage 
of messages received also increased, reaching almost 
100 percent at 324 nm range, as expected given the 
scenario’s similarly sized diameter. The improvement 
was realized because of increased message 
transmission power (hence, reduced decay), which 
increased range allowing more aircraft to fall within 
range and increased the reception probability of 
messages transmitted from aircraft already within 
range. Even without background interference, 
interference effects from the simulated traffic aircraft 
also increased with increasing the surveillance range. 
Hence, the marginal increase in message reception as 
the surveillance range was increased diminished. With 
high and very high background interference, message 
reception also increased with surveillance range, 
although at significantly suppressed levels, 
particularly at high range values where more 
interference-only aircraft were detected.  
To further investigate the effect of interference 
on message reception, the percentage of messages 
received from the messages transmitted only from 
within the surveillance range of the receiving aircraft 
is plotted in Fig. 4 at the three background 
interference levels for the 30 aircraft case. With no 
background interference, the percentage of in-range 
messages received (Fig. 4) was higher than the 
percentage of messages received measured over all 
messages (Fig. 3). Message reception increased with 
increasing surveillance range because the higher 
signal power reduces the probability of message 
dropping. Overall, interference effects diminished the 
beneficial effect of increasing surveillance range and 
tended to negate them at high and very high 
Figure 4. Effect of Surveillance Range and 
Background Interference on Percentage of In-
Range Messages Received for 30 Aircraft Case 
Figure 3. Effect of Surveillance Range and 
Background Interference on Percentage of 
Messages Received for 30 Aircraft Case 
background interference levels. The curves for the 
high and very high background interference levels 
showed an unexpected initial negative trend up to 
ranges of 150-200 nm, where the interference effects 
tended to outweigh the positive effects of increasing 
surveillance range, followed by a small positive trend 
at higher ranges, indicating a complex interaction 
between the range and interference effects. 
A possible explanation for the interaction 
follows. Increases in range add signal power, and 
hence improve the reception probability of all the 
messages transmitted including those transmitted 
from simulated traffic aircraft at distances much 
smaller than the range. Increases in range also result 
in additional messages that are transmitted from 
within range as more simulated traffic aircraft are 
within range. The added messages exhibit more decay 
and interference effects, because they are transmitted 
over longer distances, and therefore, their reception 
probability is relatively low. However, the additional 
messages constitute a fraction of the total messages 
received, that becomes increasingly smaller with 
further increase in range. Hence, the contribution of 
the additional messages to reducing the reception rate 
diminishes at high range values allowing, eventually, 
a small positive trend with range to be observed due 
to the positive impact of increased signal power due 
to range.  
Number of Conflict Detections 
Fig. 5 shows the impact of surveillance range 
and background interference on the number of 
conflict detections by all aircraft, for the 30 aircraft 
traffic density case. For the baseline condition of 
unlimited surveillance range and no interference, just 
under 300 conflicts were detected by all aircraft 
(shown again in the figure as a dashed horizontal line 
because the range value is off the chart). The effect of 
surveillance range was the most significant for the no 
background interference case (the blue curve). At 
surveillance range values approaching the diameter 
of the scenario of 320 nm, the number of conflicts 
detected is close to those detected in the baseline 
condition. This result was expected because most 
aircraft within the simulation were within range and 
most messages from these aircraft were received, as 
was shown in Fig. 4.  
As the surveillance range was decreased, the 
number of conflicts detected increased, as expected.  
For these cases, there was an increase in message 
dropping due to signal power decay and due to 
interference from the other aircraft messages. 
Message dropping can cause CD to give false alerts 
and thus, increase the number of detected conflicts, 
because an aircraft uses outdated, inaccurate 
trajectory information from another aircraft, and 
hence, may predict separation losses that are not real. 
Inaccurate traffic trajectories may also increase the 
number of missed alerts; missed alerts result in late 
detections or losses of separation (analyzed in later 
sections) that may or may not increase the conflict 
detection count. Another potential cause of the 
increase of conflict detections are secondary conflicts 
which result when an aircraft maneuvers to resolve a 
conflict with one aircraft, only to cause additional 
conflicts with the same or other aircraft, immediately 
or later in time. AOP’s CR algorithm ensures that the 
conflict resolution maneuvers are free of conflict with 
all aircraft for a 20 minute horizon for strategic 
resolutions and a 12 minute horizon for tactical 
resolutions. However, message dropping delays the 
updating of traffic trajectories, and using obsolete 
trajectories to compute CR maneuvers may cause 
secondary conflicts when the trajectories are updated. 
Note that immediate secondary conflicts are not 
counted because the conflicts need to be separated in 
time to be counted as separate in this analysis.  
At high and very high levels of background 
interference, the number of conflict detections 
generally remained elevated even as surveillance 
range was increased as shown in Fig. 5. At low 
surveillance ranges, the effect of background 
Figure 5. Number of Conflict Detections for 
30 Aircraft Case (2.07X of 2004 traffic 
levels) 
interference was limited by the small range, and 
hence, the number of conflict detections was similar 
to the no background interference case.  However, 
the effect relative to the no background interference 
case was pronounced at higher surveillance range 
values. The number of conflict detections was 
essentially flat with respect to surveillance range at 
high and very high background interference levels. 
This is explained partially by the lack of constant 
trend in the message reception rate at high and very 
high background interference levels, as was shown in 
Fig. 4. The lack of consistency in the conflict 
detection count may be related to the various sources 
of variability in this metric discussed under 
Experiment Metrics.  
Similar observations were made in the conflict 
detection counts for the 40 and 60 aircraft traffic 
density levels, shown respectively in Fig. 6 and Fig. 
7. The trends are the same as for the 30 aircraft case. 
However, the number of conflict detections increased 
significantly with traffic density, an expected result 
since a higher traffic density represents a more 
constrained airspace. In Fig. 7, the number of conflict 
detections for the no background interference case 
drops below the baseline. Although not fully 
understood, one possible source of this behavior is 
the variability discussed in the Experiment Metrics 
section involving the potential for under- and over-
counting conflicts, which is believed to be different 
between the baseline case and the no background 
interference case.   
 
 
 
Average Conflict Detection Lead Time 
Reduced surveillance range can cause delay in 
receiving trajectory information from surrounding 
traffic, and, therefore, a potential delay in some 
conflict detections. Even for aircraft within range, 
message dropping due to signal decay and 
interference impacts the availability of traffic 
trajectory information for timely conflict detection. 
The average CD lead time was used as a metric to 
investigate the timeliness of conflict detection with 
varying surveillance range and background 
interference. Conflict detections formed the basis for 
measuring the average CD lead time, and hence, the 
number of conflict detections represented the sample 
size for each experiment run, with values ranging 
from 300 to 2700, as shown in Figs. 5-7.  
AOP was configured with a CD look-ahead 
horizon of ten minutes as a threshold for earliest 
alerting because detections at longer horizons may be 
unreliable due to various uncertainties in trajectory 
prediction. Fig. 8 presents a histogram of CD lead 
times for the baseline case as well as several range 
cases at the no background interference level. For the 
baseline case, the distribution of CD lead times had a 
peak very close to ten minutes. Any conflicts that 
could have been detected earlier than ten minutes 
were instead detected at or close to ten minutes thus 
causing the peak near ten minutes. For other range 
and interference cases, use of a CD look-ahead 
horizon resulted in a bi-modal distribution for the CD 
lead time, with one peak close to ten minutes and a 
second peak whose location and relative magnitude 
Figure 6. Number of Conflicts Detections for 
40 Aircraft Case (2.76X of 2004 traffic levels)
Figure 7.  Number of Conflicts for 60 Aircraft 
Case (4.14X of 2004 traffic levels) 
to the first peak vary with the surveillance range and 
interference combinations in the experiment matrix. 
As can be seen from Fig. 8, all the range values 
presented have a peak in the nine to ten minute time 
bin. The lower range cases have a second peak in the 
four to six minute time bins.  
 
Fig. 9 shows the impact of surveillance range 
and background interference on the average CD lead 
time for the 30 aircraft case. For the baseline case of 
unlimited surveillance range and no background 
interference, the average CD lead time nearly 
coincided with the ten-minute CD look-ahead 
horizon used in the experiment. For the remaining 
cases, the average CD lead time increased with 
increase in surveillance range and decreased with 
increase in background interference, as expected. The 
average CD lead time data followed the same trends 
of the percentage of messages received, shown in 
Fig. 3. As the percentage of messages received 
increases with surveillance range, a complete set of 
TCPs is available sooner for use in CD. As 
background interference is introduced, a larger 
number of messages are dropped, and the availability 
of an accurate and complete set of TCPs for CD is 
delayed. The result was a significant reduction in the 
average CD lead time, as confirmed by a Tukey 
simultaneous pair wise comparison test. 
Fig. 9 also shows the relationship of the average 
CD lead time to AOP’s tactical CR override horizon, 
the time within which unresolved and newly detected 
conflicts are resolved with tactical maneuvers.  In this 
study, the tactical CR override horizon was set 
conservatively to five minutes (shown as a horizontal 
line) for burdened aircraft and four minutes for 
priority aircraft. At a surveillance range of 71 nm, the 
average CD lead time for all interference cases was 
close to or fell below the five-minute tactical CR 
override horizon. At higher surveillance ranges, the 
average CD lead time was greater than the tactical 
override horizon; the difference between average CD 
lead time values and the tactical override horizon 
diminished at high and very high background 
interference levels. Thus, a greater percentage of CD 
lead times were below five minutes, and tactical 
resolutions were attempted for the corresponding 
conflicts. This effect is discussed in the next 
subsection. 
 
As Fig. 9 shows, the change in average CD lead 
time was pronounced at surveillance range values 
below about 160 nm and minimal beyond 160 nm. 
This behavior highlights the dependence of the CD 
performance on the CD look-ahead horizon of the 
ASAS, in this case ten minutes. When two aircraft 
come within range of each other, the earliest conflict 
between them that can be detected is if they travel 
along a straight line toward each other, as shown in 
Fig. 10; this conflict scenario is the most sensitive to 
the magnitude of surveillance range. Since the 
earliest conflict that AOP detects is ten minutes 
away, and the average aircraft speed in the simulation 
was approximately 8 nm per minute, the earliest 
Figure 9. Effect of Surveillance Range and 
Background Interference on Average Conflict 
Detection Lead Time for 30 Aircraft Case 
Figure 8. Distribution of Conflict Detection 
Lead Times for Some Range Values for No 
Background Interference and Baseline, 30 
Aircraft Case 
conflict that can be detected is when the two aircraft 
are 160 nm apart. For example, as shown in Fig. 10, 
assuming both aircraft are flying the average speed 
the conflict would be 80 nm away from each aircraft. 
Therefore, if the surveillance range is larger than 160 
nm, a conflict could only be detected by AOP when 
the aircraft are 160 nm apart, despite coming within 
range and exchanging intent information earlier. 
Thus, increase in the surveillance range up to this 
value can correspondingly increase the average CD 
lead time, as can be seen in Fig. 9. However, at 
higher surveillance ranges, the marginal benefit of 
earlier availability of intent information should have 
little effect because AOP does not predict conflicts 
earlier than ten minutes. Increasing surveillance 
range beyond 160 nm could have a small benefit, as 
can be seen in Fig. 9, since AOP uses intent data to 
ensure that trajectories are free of conflict for 20 
minutes when resolving conflicts predicted in ten 
minutes. Additionally, increasing range beyond 160 
nm results in the reception probability for messages 
transmitted from aircraft at distances less than 160 
nm from the receiving aircraft also increasing, as 
discussed in the previous section, which might reduce 
delays in reception of intent information and thus 
CD.  
The relationship between the average CD lead 
time and traffic density was analyzed for various 
surveillance ranges at each of the three background 
interference levels. Fig. 11 presents data for the 
minimum (71 nm) and maximum (324 nm) 
surveillance range values and all the background 
interference levels tested.  The average CD lead time 
did not vary with traffic density for a given 
surveillance range and interference level. This 
observation was confirmed by conducting a Tukey 
simultaneous pair-wise comparison test at a 95% 
confidence level. 
 
Strategic versus Tactical Conflict Resolution 
In the previous section, it was seen that early 
availability of traffic intent information increases CD 
lead times which may enable AOP to resolve more 
conflicts strategically rather than tactically. Fig. 12 
shows the impact of surveillance range and 
background interference on the percentage of conflict 
resolutions that were strategic (rather than tactical) 
for the traffic density of 30 aircraft. As expected, in 
the baseline case of unlimited surveillance range and 
no interference, conflict resolutions were nearly 
Figure 12. Effect of Surveillance Range and 
Background Interference on  Strategic Conflict 
Resolutions for 30 Aircraft Case 
Figure 10. Worst Case Conflict Situation 
Figure 11. Effect of Traffic Density on Average 
Conflict Detection Lead Time for 71 nm and 324 
nm Surveillance Range Cases  
100% strategic (shown in the figure as a horizontal 
dashed line because the range value used for this case 
is off the chart). For the remainder of the cases, a 
greater surveillance range resulted in a larger 
percentage of conflict resolutions that were strategic.  
The result was expected because higher surveillance 
ranges allow conflicts to be detected and traffic intent 
information to be available sooner, and thus more 
time is available to attempt a strategic CR. 
Under higher background interference levels, the 
percentage of  conflict resolutions that were strategic 
was lower, probably due to a larger number of 
messages being dropped, thus decreasing the 
likelihood of complete traffic intent information 
being available early enough to attempt strategic CR. 
The percentage of conflict resolutions that were 
strategic was approximately 97% at 97 nm 
surveillance range for the no background interference 
case but only approximately 71% for the very high 
background interference case. At a degraded 
surveillance range of 71 nm, there was a significant 
drop in the percentage of conflict resolutions that 
were strategic for all background interference cases 
(only 20 to 40 % strategic CR).  
The percentage of resolutions that are strategic is 
related to the CD lead time and to AOP’s tactical CR 
override horizon. For example, the average CD lead 
time in the very high background interference case 
was relatively low at 6.5 minutes (see Fig. 9), which 
resulted in a large percentage of conflicts detected 
within the tactical CR override horizon. For these 
cases, strategic resolution was not attempted.  
Similarly, for all background interference cases and a 
surveillance range of 71 nm, the average CD lead 
time was at or below the five minute tactical CR 
override horizon (Fig. 9). Reducing the tactical CR 
override horizon should result in a lower percentage 
of CD lead times falling below it and thus fewer 
conflicts requiring tactical resolution.  
A correlation test confirmed that the average CD 
lead time (Fig. 9) and the percentage of conflict 
resolutions that were strategic (Fig. 12) were strongly 
correlated. The correlation coefficients are 0.824, 
0.919 and 0.997 for the no, high, and very high 
background interference cases, respectively. A t-test 
confirmed these correlation coefficients to be 
significant at the 95% confidence level with p-values 
of 0.0438, 0.0095 and 1.0027e-5, respectively. Due to 
this correlation, the rate of change of the percentage 
of strategic conflict resolutions is greatly attenuated 
beyond 160 nm, similarly to the average CD lead 
time.  
The relationship between the percentage of 
conflict resolutions that were strategic and traffic 
density was analyzed at the various surveillance 
ranges and background interference levels. As was 
the case for the average CD lead time, the percentage 
of strategic conflict resolutions did not show a trend 
with traffic density. 
Losses of Separation 
As shown in Table 4, the total number of losses 
of separation (LOSs) experienced for all runs at a 
particular traffic density increased with increasing 
traffic density. Missed alerts, latency in detecting 
conflicts, ineffectiveness of tactical resolutions, or 
delays in pilot-model execution of resolutions may 
have contributed to these LOSs. In this batch study, 
few LOSs occurred relative to the total number of 
conflict detections. For example, for the 60 aircraft 
case, only 13 LOSs were reported compared to a total 
of 47517 conflict detections and the maximum 
number of LOSs in any given run was four.  
Table 4. LOS Data for Various Traffic Densities 
Traffic 
Density 
Level (# 
aircraft) 
Number 
of LOSs 
for All 
Runs 
Number 
of Conflict 
Detections 
for All 
Runs 
Ratio of 
LOSs to 
Conflict 
Detections 
for All Runs 
30 0 9142 0 
40 3 17323 0.00017 
60 13 42427 0.00031 
 
Given the small numbers of LOSs, no trend was 
observable with respect to surveillance range or 
background interference level. In general, the low 
frequency of LOS in these scenarios indicates the 
high robustness of the AOP conflict detection and 
resolution algorithms with conflicts of random 
geometry and random background traffic, even in the 
absence of the vertical resolution degree of freedom.  
Conclusions 
This paper presented an analysis of the impact of 
ADS-B surveillance range and interference 
limitations on self-separation performance under 
different traffic density levels. Using a 2D scenario 
with no wind or weather effects, and under the 
modeling assumptions for the ADS-B and airborne 
separation assistance technologies (AOP) simulated 
in the experiment, a complex interaction was 
observed between the impact of surveillance range 
and interference as both factors are physically 
coupled. For example, under high background 
interference levels, the trends in the percentage of 
messages received from aircraft within surveillance 
range and the number of conflict detections were not 
constant over the surveillance range values. This 
behavior likely occurred because the resultant impact 
depended on balancing the opposing effects of 
increasing signal power and increasing interference, 
as surveillance range increases. Overall, as expected, 
an increase in surveillance range resulted in a 
decrease in the number of conflict detections, an 
increase in the average conflict detection lead time, 
and an increase in the percentage of conflict 
resolutions that were strategic, all of which are 
considered benefits. These benefits were attenuated at 
higher background interference levels. Dependence 
on the parameters of the separation assistance 
algorithms was also observed. For example, the 
majority of the benefit was observed when range was 
increased to 160 nm which is the average relative 
separation between head-on aircraft for conflicts 
detected at the ten-minute conflict detection look-
ahead time. For the MOPS Class A3 surveillance 
range requirement (97 nm), AOP  was able to resolve 
conflicts strategically 97% of the time with no 
background interference and 71% of the time even 
with very high background interference. An increase 
in traffic density resulted in a significant increase in 
the number of conflict detections and a small increase 
in the number of LOSs but had no effect on the 
conflict detection lead time or the percentage of 
conflict resolutions that were strategic.  
Future Work 
This study focused on the impact of surveillance 
range and interference environment on self-
separation performance. The impacts of several other 
surveillance system characteristics on self-separation 
performance need to be studied. These include the 
surveillance message content and frequency and the 
use of complementary systems such as TIS-B in case 
of unavailability of information via ADS-B for 
unequipped aircraft. The ASAS approach for 
handling dropped messages should also be 
investigated to identify opportunities to mitigate the 
impact of surveillance system limitations on self-
separation performance. For example, AOP (the 
ASAS used in this study) requires a complete TC 
report set for a traffic aircraft to perform CD. In the 
presence of message dropping, the reception of a 
complete TC report set can experience delays and, 
thus, delay accurate CD. To mitigate this effect, the 
ASAS may be designed to perform CD based on 
partial intent information (e.g., partial TC report 
sets). Finally, the analysis may be performed in more 
realistic scenarios involving vertical CR, wind and 
weather effects, and mixed operations of self-
separating aircraft and aircraft managed by a ground 
system. 
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